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Abstract
Business intelligence (BI) is a DSS discipline aimed at providing timely, accurate
information and analytical capabilities to support business decision-making. Despite much
research on BI, though, we still understand little about how it actually affects decisions,
because most of the literature has a data-centric or technology-centric focus which takes
decision-making for granted. A decision-centric study of business intelligence is difficult
because of the diversity of, and tension between, normative and descriptive theories of
decision-making. We propose to view business intelligence as a theory-performing discipline
in which a dialogue between academics and practitioners transforms normative decision
theories into prescriptive theories-in-use. We identify three theories that constitute our
current understanding of decision-making, and relate them to three separate but
complementary slices of business intelligence practice. We are able to separate the
complicated activities of business intelligence into three rational logics of action. We discuss
how these three practices fit together, their interactions, and their relationship to the concepts
of strategic, tactical, and operational business intelligence. We conclude that the way BI
practitioners think about decision shapes the organizational and technological interventions
they make in the name of business intelligence. We also consider future directions for
research.
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BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE AND DECISION MAKING: UNDERSTANDING B.I. AS A
THEORY-PERFORMING DISCIPLINE OF DECISION IMPROVEMENT
Business intelligence (BI), as a professional discipline, prescribes organizational and
technological interventions aimed at providing timely, accurate information to the right people,
at the right times, to enable and improve business decision-making (Watson, 2009). It falls
firmly within the domain of decision support systems (DSS), and scarcely an academic paper or
vendor sales-pitch fails to mention BI’s power to impact decision-making (Russell et al., 2010;
Imhoff & White, 2008). Despite the volume of ink spilled on BI, though, we still have little
understanding of how its tools and strategies affect decisions, because most of the literature has a
data-centric or technology-centric focus which takes decision-making for granted. Given this
blind spot, it is no wonder that management and information systems researchers are asking why
we aren’t making better decisions already (Davenport, 2009).
One of the challenges in taking a decision-centric view of business intelligence is the
embattled state of decision-making theories themselves. While the perfectly-informed, rational
decision maker (or “economic man”) is still held up as a normative ideal in some economics
theorizing, organization theorists have for decades chipped away at it, charting the limits of
information and rationality, and even undermining the concept of decision-making as an
intentional activity (Cohen, March, & Olsen, 1972). Behavioral scientists have won a pyrrhic
victory over economists, piling up reasons why rational choice shouldn’t occur, but leave us with
no new tools to understand or advise decision makers whose daily challenge is to make rational
choices. Cabantous and Gond (2010) propose that we thread the needle between the economic
theories that assume rationality, and the behavioral theories that despair of its impossibility, with
research into the effortful processes by which managers access normative theory and use it to
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produce rational decision-making in organizations. We believe it would be fruitful to view
business intelligence as part of the theory-performing practice (or praxis) they refer to.
This view bridges the chasm between normative theories of how decisions should be
made, and the reality of how they are made, by conceiving of BI managers and developers as
designers who turn theory into prescriptions for sociotechnical solutions. Good theories of
decision-making are performative, meaning they have an effect on the world that they describe,
and we highlight the role that academic researchers play as producers of the normative theories
that influence decision support systems. The subjects of our study are, therefore, the change
agents who influence decision-making practices, the theories that guide their thinking about
decision-making, and the kinds of technological and organizational interventions they make in
the name of business intelligence. Our objective is to explain the prescriptions coming out of
business intelligence practice in terms of the normative and descriptive theories prevalent in the
discipline, and also to stimulate thinking about how business intelligence would be different if it
were informed by different ideas, for example another culture.

From Normative and Descriptive to Prescriptive Theory
Consider the interaction between normative, descriptive, and prescriptive theories of
decision-making. As Bell, Raiffa, and Tversky (1988) observed, these types of theory are
generally separated by disciplinary walls: mathematical economists are concerned with
normative theories of how people should make decisions according to fundamental principles,
psychologists and behavioral scientists study how people do make decisions, rational or
otherwise. “But there is a third interest group, the methodologists, the consultants, call them what
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you will. Some of us are concerned with the bottom line: how do you improve the quality of
decisions in practice? It is one thing to talk of axioms and proofs and paradoxes and cognitive
limitations – but how can you really help?” (Bell et al 1988, p. ix). This is the challenge for
prescriptive theory.
The Information Systems discipline, along with operations research and other sciences of
the artificial (Simon 1996), is concerned with organizational interventions (such as information
technologies) that help our subjects strive for the normative “should” while coping with the
descriptive “do”. According to our field’s philosophy of science (Gregor, 2006), we approach
the prescriptive in a couple of different ways: on the one hand, we generate (design)
prescriptions (“recipes”) for building specific IT solutions to specific business problems,
evaluating them in the normative terms of utility and originality; on the other, we create
descriptive theories about prescriptions, in “behavioral” or “economics” IS research of the
phenomena that occur around purposeful IT artifacts. These two modes of knowledge creation
are fundamental to our field and seen as mutually informing (Gregor, 2009; Hevner et al., 2004).
This paradigm unfortunately skips over the question of how prescriptions are derived
from normative and descriptive theory, treating design as more of an art than a science. To
answer this question, we need a model that incorporates descriptive or normative theories as
inputs, and prescriptions (theoretical or otherwise) as outputs. The lens of design theory is one
such model, explaining how IS researchers draw on kernel theories from natural and social
sciences to transform them into formalized meta-designs for classes of information systems
(Gregor, 2007; Walls, Widmeyer, & El Sawy, 1992, 2004). We also see research that views
practitioners as design theorists of a sort, creating theories-in-use (Argyris & Schön, 1978) that
differ from design theory in that they are informal, possibly implicit, and their roots in formal
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theory may be unknown to their users. Theories-in-use make claims about effective action, not
about objective truth.
The main weakness shared by the design theory and theory-in-use perspectives is that
they take the normative/descriptive kernel theories as givens, which prevents us from
hypothesizing about how practice might evolve differently if different theories predominated – as
might be the case when comparing practices across cultures. Following Gregor (2006, 2007), we
need to put kernel theories into their proper perspective, as abstract, man-made artifacts
belonging to Popper’s “World 3”. It is important to view these theories as contingencies upon
which the prescriptive process could hinge. Another problem with the two perspectives is that
neither has room for an entire discipline, full of back-and-forth between research and practice, as
is the case in DSS and business intelligence. The design theory view attributes all the work of
prescriptive theorizing to academic researchers, and the theories-in-use perspective conceives of
practitioners proceeding by trial-and-error in a kind of theory vacuum.
We believe that the Cabantous and Gond (2010) framework is an excellent blueprint for a
whole-discipline model that overcomes these weaknesses. It explains that the normative theory
of rational choice, created by academics and shared with practitioners, becomes social reality as
it is embedded and engineered (“performed”) into the activities, conventions, and tools of
decision-making. The focus of the Cabantous and Gond model is neither the kernel theory nor
the prescriptions, but rather the activities that connect them. It is reproduced in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of Cabantous and Gond (2010)

A Spectrum of Rationality
The chief limitation of Cabantous and Gond (2010) is that it considers the theory of
“rational choice” to be a singular normative theory. Yet, we know that several theories compete
to explain “rational” decision making, and when multiple and contradictory theories compete for
the attention of information systems professionals, they are transformed by practitioners into
diverse prescriptions of widely varying merit, as Sarker and Lee (2002) found in the study of
business process redesign. We are reminded of Graham Allison’s famous study of the Cuban
missile crisis (Allison & Zelikow, 1999), which showed that a decision can be viewed through at
least three theoretical lenses, and each may show a different choice to be the most rational; a
decision that doesn’t seem rational in terms of short-term goals, for example, may reflect a
rational organizing principle, or a rational political calculus.
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As Information Systems is a science of the artificial, concerned with IT artifacts and
business systems (Gregor, 2006, 2009), our goal and approach differs somewhat from Allison’s.
Whereas he tried to explain a history of decisions, events, and actions using three different
theories of interest to researchers, we wish to explain how a set of theories known to practice
contribute to a wide array of prescriptions for technological and organizational interventions for
improving decision-making. We extend the Cabantous and Gond framework by positing that
multiple normative theories of decision making occur simultaneously; each theory speaking to
different actors and suggesting different interventions. Our model is illustrated by Figure 2.

THEORIES
Normative Theories of
Decision-Making
Theory A
Theory C
Theory B

“Engineering”

“Conventionalizing”

“Commodifying”

ACTORS
Business Intelligence
professionals, managers,
and others interested in
improving decisions

INTERVENTIONS
Prescriptions for Improving
Decision Outcomes

Figure 2. Business intelligence as a multiple theory-performing practice.
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Slices of Practice
The reader may ascertain from Figure 2 that the real practice of business intelligence
contains a cacophony of different actors, viewpoints, theories-in-use, and prescriptions for
technological, organizational, and strategic interventions, much unlike the clean and simple
world depicted in Figure 1. A participant armed with a single theoretical perspective, therefore,
may find some BI prescriptions thoroughly sensible, and deem others to be useless or beside the
point. In order to understand the practice, therefore, we suggest “slicing” it according to
operative theories, and looking at how each in turn is used by actors to form prescriptions.
Allison and Zelikow (1999) demonstrated that three distinct theories of decision-making,
erstwhile competitors, were best seen as co-present and complementary in explaining a narrative
of decisions made and taken in a real-world scenario. We, too, see three kernel theories as
complementary influences on business intelligence practice – each theory speaking to different
parts of the academic and practitioner audience, and contributing to different theory-performing
practices. The kernel theories we consider are: bounded rational choice, in which decisionmakers select from among alternative choices to the best of their abilities given limited
information, time, and attention; distributed cognition, in which decisions result from the
interdependent behavior of individuals within a group context characterized by culture,
processes, and cognitive tools like IT; and organized anarchies, in which decisions emerge as
people and groups with markedly different interests, abilities, and political options interact,
bargain, and compete.
This is not an exhaustive list of all possible theories of decision-making rationality,
rather, these are three theories that are readily evident in academic and practical business
intelligence literature today. They are different from, but can trace their lineage to, the three
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models that Allison identified in 1971. If other understandings of decision-making rationality
held sway – as they have in the past, and will in the future – we would expect different
prescriptions to drive practice. As each theory is characterized by different assumptions, and
focuses on different kinds of actors and behaviors, we believe that each is received by a different
audience with its own goals, constraints, and levers of control, and attracts the interest of a
different set of academics as well. Thus a few theories that are all “rational” lead to the broad
spectrum of practical prescriptions and research questions that form the business intelligence
discipline. We now consider the three practices as “slices” of business intelligence: decision
development, capability crafting, and issue illumination.

Decision Development
Kernel theory
The main approach to understanding how people make decisions in business, under
uncertainty, has been to identify their limitations – finite time, incomplete information, limited
attention and computational abilities – and to research the techniques that allow decision-makers
to cope with these limitations. Since at least the 1950s this research has been advanced under the
rubric of bounded rationality because it was initially proffered as a replacement for the untenable
assumptions of perfect information and perfect rationality that underpinned classical and
neoclassical economics (Simon, 1979). It includes descriptive theories in fields as diverse as
economics, psychology, and organization theory, and prescriptive traditions in operations
research and decision support systems. The common thread is a shared interest in how decision-
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makers choose between alternatives, as opposed to the classical economist’s focus on what they
choose.
Central to a theory of bounded rationality is the concept of search. Decision-makers may
not know all their alternative choices, and even if they do, they have only incomplete
information about each alternative and its consequences, so they engage in active search for
alternatives and for information. This search is guided by heuristics, a set of rules about how to
search, when to stop searching (“stopping rules”), and how to choose from among the
alternatives based on the information. The term “heuristics” has been associated with “rules of
thumb” and with “biases” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), suggesting pessimistically that
bounded rationality is merely a handicapped version of some economic principle like utility
maximization, but it can be seen as a normative theory in terms of procedural rationality
(Simon, 1979), the logic of appropriateness (Cabantous & Gond, 2010), or ecological rationality
(Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000).
Todd and Gigerenzer (2000) argue that a generalized decision criterion like utility
maximization is not normative, not only because it is impossible, but because our attempts to
achieve it are destructive of the ends decision-makers care about: making the right choices under
uncertainty with limited time and resources. Heuristics constitute an “adaptive tool kit” of
computational strategies that allow decision-makers to exploit the structures of their information
environments to make fast and accurate decisions with limited time and effort. Each decision
domain may have a different information environment, so multiple heuristic strategies are
needed. For example, a domain characterized by perishable alternatives that arrive one at a time,
such as potential mates or potential investments, calls for a “satisficing” heuristic in which the
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decision maker sets an aspiration level of some criterion and continues the search for alternatives
until one that exceeds the aspiration level is found, then chooses that one.
Because of their environmental specificity, heuristics are adaptive rather than optimizing.
Because of their simplicity, however, they are robust to environmental change. Attempts to
achieve the classical economic norm of rationality, by applying massive amounts of data and
computational power to a problem, could easily become less optimal by overfitting its statistical
models to unimportant variables in historical data. The normative theory of bounded rationality,
therefore, requires that we understand the information structure of the problem environment(s),
and utilize heuristic rules (for guiding search, stopping search, and choosing an alternative) that
optimally balance accuracy, frugality, and speed of decision making. Different rules may apply
to different decisions.
Assumptions and focus of kernel theory
Theories of bounded rationality share three main assumptions: we are given a specific
decision-maker, faced with a specific decision (or type of decision), for which a finite set of
alternatives exist, though they may not be known to the decision-maker. Although these
assumptions may not seem too bold, scholars familiar with decision-making literature know that
in many real-life situations it isn’t certain what is to be decided, when, or by whom, from what
set of options. Nevertheless, the assumptions of bounded rationality apply to many realistic
decision-making situations, such as the casting of a vote, the purchase of a car, the selection of
an employee, and so on.
The focus of the bounded rationality lens is not the who, the what, or the when, but the
how of decision-making. What rules and heuristic strategies best guide decision-makers as they
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search for alternatives, make inferences about the relative merits and consequences of each
choice, and ultimately stop searching and make a choice?
Community of practice
As bounded rationality takes decisions and decision-makers as givens, its perspective
most likely resonates with DSS developers and BI consultants who are tasked with supporting a
decision-making process that is given to them. As mentioned above, there are many real-world
situations in which these things are fixed – for example, a banker judging a loan application, a
project manager selecting a contractor for a job, or a doctor diagnosing a patient’s illness – and
the BI practitioner’s job is to create and improve the tools and methods for gathering
information, evaluating alternatives, and making the decision. By contrast, this community of
practice probably excludes high-level managers like CIOs who are more concerned with
organizational matters than with the details of specific decision support applications. For that
reason, we feel that the label decision development best captures this first archetype of business
intelligence.
DSS research questions
Academic researchers participate in the decision development practice by improving our
understanding of decision types (what Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000 call “the information structure
of the environments”), and by developing, prescribing, and testing heuristic strategies for
different types of environments. They combine what we know about the human mind, and
human-computer interaction, with our practical knowledge of technology, to make and test
prescriptive theories about IT tools that enable new heuristics, or enhance their performance for
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particular decision types. A great deal of DSS research since the early days of the field has joined
this conversation. Here are just a few examples of relevant research questions:


How does the technology for data visualization affect decision performance, or not affect
it, depending on the task environment and decision type? (Dickson, DeSanctis, &
McBride, 1986)



How do decision support systems reduce the cognitive effort associated with particular
decision-making strategies, to enable decision-makers to employ those strategies instead
of others? (Todd & Benbasat, 1994)



What are the best “matches” between the characteristics of decisions and the
characteristics of DSS technology? (Goodhue & Thompson, 1995)



How does the provision of long-term historical data in a marketing data warehouse affect
decision-makers’ performance on a market prioritization decision? (Park, 2006)



How can DSS be intentionally designed to reduce logical and mechanical errors in
DAMCDA (discrete alternative multicriteria decision analysis) decision-making?
(Williams et al., 2007)

Example prescriptions
Description development provides a number of prescriptions; some highly technical, such
as new decision-making algorithms from statistics and computer science, and others more
accessible to laymen, such as the claim that a balanced scorecard (BSC) is an effective tool for
balancing the organization’s priorities in strategic decision making (Kaplan & Norton, 1996). At
any DSS industry exposition one encounters prescriptions for new types of data visualizations,
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new types of analytical tools, real-time systems, and dashboards, each intended to support a
specific type of decision-making task better than its competitors. Any prescription that deals with
search for information, analysis of alternatives, or methods for choosing, is part of decision
development.

Capability Crafting
Kernel theory
Bounded rationality has good explanatory and normative value when decisions and
decision-makers are well-defined, but in research and practice we are often challenged with more
complicated phenomena. Real-world enterprises are social systems composed of interdependent
parts, but greater than the sums of their parts, and instead of discrete decisions they face
“messes” made up of multiple, interrelated problems (Ackoff, 1994). To cope with such messes
we need to be able to take a broader view of the context within which simple decisions are made.
The theory of distributed cognition provides a lens for such inquiry. Initially developed from
ethnographic studies of airplane cockpits and ship crews, this theory views teams and
organizations as cognitive systems that produce cognitive outputs such as decisions (Hutchins,
1995a, 1995b; Weick & Roberts, 1993). As with individual cognition, group cognition involves
the acquisition and interpretation of information, the storage and retrieval of memory, the
formation of judgments and choices, and the motivation of action. The difference is that in
distributed cognition, these activities take place in sociotechnical systems of people, information
technology, rules and routines (Hollan, Hutchins, & Kirsh, 2000). As a result, the cognitive
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processes are easier to observe, and possibly subject to a different set of conditions and
influences than individual cognition.
Some of the core concepts of a theory of distributed cognition are the technologies (work
materials) that serve functions analogous to memory or analysis, the human actors who interact
with the technologies and with each other, and the organization of the cognitive system:
“Cognitive processes involve trajectories of information (transmission and transformation), so
the patterns of these information trajectories, if stable, reflect some underlying cognitive
architecture.” (Hollan et al., 2000, p. 177). Another major feature of these theories is attention to
the context within which distributed cognition takes place. Cognitive systems are part of larger
systems, such as the enterprise, and they draw on organizational culture, which can be viewed as
a language for interpreting information and a tool kit of decision frameworks. As such, culture
both facilitates and constrains group cognition.
A related theoretical idea is that of capability development. (Ethiraj et al., 2005).
Capabilities are routines or methods that a group develops and maintains at some cost of time or
money, and that it can reproduce when necessary to solve a particular type of problem. When
we’re talking about cognitive tasks like decision making, some relevant capabilities are
knowledge capabilities (Freeze & Kulkarni, 2007), sensing and responding capabilities (Overby,
Bharadwaj, & Sambamurthy, 2006), absorptive capacity (Malhotra, Gosain, & El Sawy, 2005),
and transactive memory (Wegner, 1986). Like organizational culture, a system’s capability set
enables it to carry out some types of decision-making very efficiently, but at the expense of some
flexibility as new types of information or decisions may not fit perfectly with established
cognitive routines. A cognitive system may also develop dynamic capabilities and
improvisational capabilities that help it modify or work around its existing capability set as the
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environment changes (Pavlou & El Sawy, 2010). The mix of capabilities clearly depends on the
demands of the task environment. We begin to move into normative territory.
In a normative theory of distributed cognition, the manager or architect of a
sociotechnical system is expected to engineer (Upton et al., 2008) or orchestrate (Lovallo &
Sibony, 2010) the whole system. He or she assigns people to roles, decides what will be decided,
and by whom, determines the resources and technologies (work materials) that they will use, and
architects the decision-making routines that make up the system’s capability set, all while
managing the interdependencies of system parts. The normative ideal is one in which the
cognitive system is designed in an optimal way for the kinds of tasks it faces. One does not
“satisfice” or even “optimize” the system to deal with a particular problem, one redesigns the
system so that the problem no longer exists, or is transformed into something more tractable
(Ackoff, 1994).
Assumptions and focus of kernel theory
Unlike bounded rationality, the distributed cognition approach doesn’t take the identity of
decision-makers or even the specific type of decision as a given, instead, it assumes that
cognitive architectures are contingent and malleable. What they do generally assume is that some
sort of a manager can perceive the system, has some lever(s) of control over it, and cares about
its performance according to an objective standard. If a distributed cognition study features
neither a manager nor a goal, then it is a descriptive ethnography and not a normative or
prescriptive theory.
A second major assumption, which underpins the concepts of cognitive architecture and
routine capabilities, is that of stability, or gradual change. It serves no purpose to study the
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architecture of a cognitive group if it is a unique one-time collaboration, and social-cognitive
capabilities make little sense if problem characteristics, information sources, and objective goals
are changing radically and unpredictably.
Actors, technologies, and routines feature in the distributed cognition perspective, but
there is a special focus on the interactions between them, and the decisions that result from these
interactions. For example, Michel (2007) compared two organizations and showed that their
different methods of assigning people to tasks (a work process) created different levels of
uncertainty (a task characteristic) which caused workers to develop different information-sharing
routines (a capability) resulting in different types of decision-making (a cognitive outcome).
Community of practice
The distributed cognition lens is mere sophistry to practitioners who have neither the
opportunity to perceive an entire system nor the authority to change it, so it may not find a
receptive audience among decision developers, as described in the previous section. Instead,
distributed cognition is most relevant to managers, whether of small groups or large ones, to
CIOs and CEOs and entrepreneurs, and perhaps to the data architects and consultants who also
take a big-picture view of all the decision-making activity in a department, process, or enterprise.
These practitioners are interested not in designing specific tools, but in orchestrating human
resources and IT systems into efficient, effective, and adaptive groups. They may have the
opportunity to redesign entire business processes from scratch (Sarker & Lee, 2002), but often
they pull smaller levers, for example introducing a new technique to confront decision bias
(Lovallo & Sibony, 2010), or auditing and intervening in one decision-making process at a time
(Davenport, 2009). In this practice, the enterprise is a kind of cognitive machine, whose parts are
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capabilities, and practitioners are more often its mechanics than its designers, so we call the
practice capability crafting.
DSS research questions
Information systems researchers have much to contribute to the practice of capability
crafting. As the only major discipline that studies systems in organizations (Alter, 2003), we can
contribute generally by developing frameworks and theories for mapping out and intervening in
complex and interdependent systems. More specifically, we have developed and tested theories
about methods of process management and process redesign, we have studied technologies that
perform cognitive roles – such as organizational memory IS (Stein & Zwass, 1995) and
knowledge management systems (Alavi & Leidner, 2001) – and we have studied how individual
technologies enhance social-cognitive capabilities like coordination and communication. Some
examples of research questions that may inform capability crafting are listed here:


How should we design a “distributed cognition IS” that enables users to represent, share,
discuss, and act on their different understandings of an issue? (Boland, Tenkasi, &
Te’eni, 1994).



What are the different kinds of knowledge capabilities, how is each one leveraged by the
organization, and which technologies enable them? (Freeze & Kulkarni, 2007)



What constitutes an effective methodology for mapping out the “distributed cognition
configuration” of a complex sociotechnical enterprise, and modeling the effects of
organizational change on that configuration? (Upton et al., 2008)
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How do knowledge management activities moderate the effect of business intelligence
technologies on decision-making? Can “knowledge exchange protocols” help integrate
BI into business processes? (Herschel & Yermish, 2009)



Do business intelligence (BI) systems enhance organizational coordination mechanisms?
(Ferrari & Rossignoli, 2010)

Example prescriptions
Prescriptions abound in practitioner literature, hailing the benefits of new analytics-based
strategies (Davenport, 2006) or re-engineering all the decisions in an organization (Davenport,
2009). They prescribe changes to decision techniques, decision ownership, decision criteria, and
decision-maker incentives. There is no shortage of software vendors or consultants who will
advise starting over from scratch with entirely new organizational information systems to
implement new and better cognitive strategies. If there is a weakness with these prescriptions, it
is that they assume near-omnipotence and a great deal of money besides, and are consequently
more relevant to CEOs than to ordinary managers, or harried CIOs, who are simply trying to
work with the systems they’re given. Perhaps we need more prescriptions for levers of change
that can be implemented one at a time to “tune up” cognitive systems as business goes on.

Issue Illumination
Kernel theory
The curiosity of decision theorists and the vexations of decision-makers have led to a
third line of inquiry into those problems that are neither well-defined nor stable and controllable.
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These are the “wicked problems” (Rittel & Webber, 1973). Among their characteristics are: the
involvement of many stakeholders with different goals and priorities; complex and tangled
interdependencies; uniqueness that flummoxes routines and precedents; and the need for ongoing
effort as the problem can never really be ended (Camillus, 2008). We use the term organized
anarchies for the family of theories about how people grapple with these apparently-intractable
problems. Cohen et al (1972) simulate organized anarchies with a “garbage can model” in which
problems looking for solutions, solutions looking for problems, and people looking for decisionmaking opportunities, bounce around randomly until they come together by happenstance,
resulting in a decision. However, their description of these anarchies as “organized” is an
acknowledgement that we can at least try to “tract” these apparently-intractable problems.
Organized anarchies are characterized by a particular type of organizational, industry, or
technological environment in which systems are so complex and dynamic that it is hard for any
individual to perceive its cause-effect structure (Weick, 1990). These environments are turbulent
in the sense they are not regulated by any equilibrium-seeking forces, so small actions and onetime decisions can compound unpredictably into large system shocks (Emery & Trist, 1965).
Tight coupling between systems and dependencies that cross levels of analysis (Selsky, Goes, &
Baburoglu, 2007) mean that theories of organized anarchies must connect phenomena at the
individual and group levels with phenomena at the organization and industry levels in order to
make sense of them. The theoretical term sensemaking (Weick, 1990) describes how we try to
understand and solve these problems.
Normative theories for organized anarchies are less developed than those for bounded
rationality and distributed cognition, but they do exist. Emery and Trist (1965) argued that the
most important implication of turbulent fields was that the fortunes of all participants are
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positively correlated, so their participants (firms, in their view) should find ways to compete with
one another that do not harm the overall health of the field. They recommended the collective
establishment of social values to stabilize and transform the turbulence into order. This is similar
to Camillus’s (2008) proposition at a within-firm level of analysis: stakeholders should “tame”
wicked problems by creating a shared understanding of them, and framing them in terms of a
collective mission and values. One normative ideal is that individuals and groups should come
together at a whole-field level to implement collective solutions , thereby transforming
turbulence into order (Iansiti & Levien, 2004; Selsky et al., 2007). Another is that we should
remain flexible in our sensemaking, ready to “drop our tools” and view problems from a
different level of analysis at any moment (Meyer, Gaba, & Colwell, 2005). Needless to say,
transforming these norms into effective prescriptions is a challenge worthy of great minds.
Assumptions and focus of kernel theory
Organized anarchies are characterized by problematic preferences as stakeholders have
different goals or, at least, different priorities; by unclear technology, in other words, processes
and cognitive systems are too complex for any stakeholder to perceive the whole picture of how
they work; and by fluid participation, as different stakeholders participate unpredictably in
different issues and decisions (Cohen et al., 1972). Like distributed cognition, a normative theory
of organized anarchies assumes that a manager cares about the achievement of some sort of goal,
but unlike distributed cognition, there is no assumption that the task or environment will be the
same tomorrow as it is today. Thus, the assumed goal may be something more Darwinian, like
organizational survival, rather than specific, such as optimizing an investment portfolio or
maximizing widget sales. Moreover, the manager will be assumed to be in competition with
other actors who have their own goals and levers of control.

Sprouts - http://sprouts.aisnet.org/10-84

The foci of organized anarchy theories are the causal texture of the environment, which
may be of several types, and the coping strategies that people and groups employ to deal with
them. There may also be a focus on the political process or bargaining that takes place between
stakeholders (Eisenhardt & Zbaracki, 1992). These theories are also self-conscious of multiple
levels of analysis, connecting phenomena at individual, group, organization, and industry levels.
Community of practice
If decisions and objectives are well-defined, one practices decision development, and if a
stable socio-technical system can make a problem tractable, one practices capability crafting. By
the process of elimination, then, the idea of organized anarchy is most applicable to those
situations where the DSS professional has little say in who the participants of a social-cognitive
process might be, which decision criteria will be important to each of them, or how they will
make decisions. This may be the challenge for designers of technology, like GDSS, that are to be
sold to other firms. It is also highly relevant to CIOs and project managers tasked with building
information systems for groups who do not agree on their requirements or goals, as is often the
case in strategic decision support at the executive level. El Sherif and El Sawy (1988) described
the plight of an IT department tasked with serving a national Cabinet defined by conflicting
goals, unstructured decision-making processes, and shifting political winds. They had no
mandate to change the political process, so instead they made their job one of “structuring”
strategic issues by integrating and cleaning data, defining a single version of the truth, and
increasing its accessibility to Cabinet ministers. As this slice of practice is concerned not with
resolving disagreements but with supporting and enlightening them, we call it issue illumination.
DSS research questions
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There are number of questions about issue illumination that we need better answers to.
The technological challenges alone of building systems for unknown users to make unstructured
decisions based on unknown criteria strain the industry’s best engineers, so design theories that
can inform them are in serious demand. Beyond that, though, we need to understand
organizational issues like how decision support systems affect debate, and how political tension
in organizations impacts technology adoption and use. Commensurate with issue illumination’s
interest in multiple levels of analysis, we are also interested in how IT changes the causal texture
of the problem environment, for example, how it makes firms more or less dependent on their
ecosystem of partners and competitors. Research that falls under this heading is not yet tightly
integrated, but a few exemplary research questions include:


How does an “issue based” methodology for DSS design and deployment differ from a
“decision based” methodology, and what are its benefits? (El Sherif & El Sawy, 1988)



What are the characteristics of new technologies that affect sensemaking, and what new
concepts (e.g. structuration) are needed to understand their effects on organizations?
(Weick, 1990)



What is an effective design (meta-design) for a class of information systems to support
emergent knowledge practices (EKPs) in which process, participants, and information
requirements are unpredictable? (Markus, Majchrzak, & Gasser, 2002)



How can firms take advantage of “creation nets” to plug into open innovation at the
multi-firm (ecosystem) level, and what changes does that require in the way leaders think
about competition? (Hagel & Brown, 2008)
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How are tasks and information systems reciprocally linked? How can we identify the
trajectory of their emergent evolution? (Berthon et al., 2007)

Example prescriptions
The most widespread product of the issue illumination practice is the mantra “single
version of the truth” that is found in virtually every textbook or brochure about data warehousing
and digital dashboards. The core of this idea is not that it ends disagreement, but quite the
contrary: it allows us to make our arguments more emphatically with unimpeachable data to back
us up. Other prescriptions that come from this practice are those that advise the “innovation
champion” in an organization as to how he can garner top management sponsorship for his
project, or attract users to his DSS. Integrating the data and structuring the digital scorecards
doesn’t constitute a successful BI project unless and until a number of business users with very
different goals can agree to use the system to structure their interactions.

Contrasting Practices
Table 1 differentiates the three “slices” of business intelligence according to their kernel
theories, assumptions and focus, the DSS practitioners that they apply to, and important topics
for academic research that inform them.
Table 1. Comparison of business intelligence practices
Decision development

Capability crafting

Issue Illumination

Kernel
theories

Bounded rationality;
heuristics

Distributed cognition;
organizational
capabilities

Organized anarchies;
turbulent environments;
wicked problems

Theory

Decision and decision-

A socio-technical

Multiple stakeholders
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assumptions
and focus

maker are specified;
alternatives are finite but
may not be known

cognitive system with a
manager who can
perceive it, a clear goal,
and some levers of
control

with different priorities;
intractably complex
interrelations; cross-level
reverberations

Community
of practice

DSS developers

Business process owners, Harried CIOs and
entrepreneurial
developers, supporting
multiple user groups who
managers, and CIOs
don’t know what they
want

DSS
research
topics

Decision types; ITenabled heuristics for
search and analysis; IT’s
effects on cognitive
limitations

Business process
design/management;
organizational memory,
knowledge management;
IT-enabled socialcognitive capabilities

Issue structuring; GDSS
for unstructured
decisions; digital
business ecosystems;
social/political effects of
DSS

A Theory of Business Intelligence
We conceptualize business intelligence as a complex theory-performing practice in which
multiple normative theories of decision-making are transformed into prescriptive theories-in-use
through a rich dialogue involving academics, practitioners, and others: consultants, publishers,
students, vendors, professional organizations. This dialogue constitutes the discipline of business
intelligence. Our view helps bring some order to what might seem like a cacophony of diverse
and conflicting technological, organizational, and strategic prescriptions, by teasing it apart into
three distinct practices that are each rationally sound.
But how, we may ask, do practitioners access academic theories, and furthermore, how
do they apply the right theory for the right problems? Cabantous and Gond (2010) explain that
theories of rationality are performative, that they become social reality by being performed in
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practice. Three activities contribute to this process: we engineer rationality, by building
information systems like DSS that have rational rules and work processes embedded in them; we
conventionalize rationality, by spreading our normative theories to students in business schools
and through professional organizations; and we commoditize rationality by identifying what
works in one firm and packaging it in books and consulting toolkits to be copied and sold to
everyone else. We believe that different technologies, different classes, and different books
speak to different parts of the audience. It is the match between the assumptions and focus of a
theory, and the constraints and goals of a practitioner, that guides each decision engineer to the
theory-based practice that is most relevant to his needs.
An important part of our theory is that the three slices of business intelligence are
complementary. Organizations do not need to choose one practice, as if they were competing
methodologies, but instead researchers need to understand how all three fit together. One way to
do this might be to look at the three practices in terms of strategic, tactical, and operational
business intelligence, a common distinction made by practitioners. Decision development is the
engineering of IT-enhanced strategies for supporting specific decisions at the operational level.
Capability crafting can be seen as the engineering of man-machine systems composed of many
decisions in order to achieve predetermined goals, a tactical endeavor. Issue illumination can be
seen as IT support for the unstructured decision-making and uncertainty management that often
characterizes the strategy-making process. The three approaches may be used by different people
at different levels of the same company.
Alternatively, we may show that multiple practices involve the same people. For
example, Simons (1990, 1991) discovered that top managers (at the strategic level) had two
distinct modes of using management information systems: for most issues, they would build an
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organization, give it a performance target, and let their subordinates run things; for one or two
issues that represented great strategic uncertainty, though, they would make an information
system their central sensemaking tool, using its numbers as part of every major meeting and
frequently asking for new measures and targets. It seems like they were applying both capability
crafting and issue illumination to strategic business intelligence. We can also see at the
operational level that capability crafting and decision development are frequently done together:
while a decision engineer is thinking about what kinds of data and analyses are necessary to
make a particular decision well (decision development), he is also thinking about the processes
that will collect the data, how it should be communicated, and how the decision is to be
disseminated and carried out in conjunction with other decisions (capability crafting). We may
conceive of all three practices as mutually informing.

Directions for Future DSS Theorizing
We have presented a descriptive theory of business intelligence practice as a discipline
composed of three parallel and interdependent practices, each performing an identifiable
normative theory of decision-making. We believe that this approach provides a better avenue to
understanding BI phenomena than other approaches that focus on technology or data, and creates
several opportunities for future research. An important next question is, what prescriptions can
we produce based on this theory? Would it serve our students better, for example, if we divided
the teaching curriculum into three units on decisions, cognitive systems, and unstructured issues,
respectively? Or can the three models of practice be combined into a systematic methodology for
business intelligence development?
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Perhaps knowledge of the practice’s “slices” will help us to build theory around the
business intelligence “maturity models” that are ubiquitous in the literature. Perhaps the
developmental stages of a business intelligence project naturally progress from decision
development to capability crafting and issue structuring as the BI team discovers new needs, or
perhaps it is the case that business intelligence efforts evolve over time as academic theories of
decision-making fall in and out of favor. Russell et al (2010) present a promising BI maturity
model that allows for both a typical progression of implementation skills and the evolution of
what business intelligence is thought to mean.
Since we see kernel theories as important inputs to the BI discipline, it is natural to
wonder how the practice might be different if theories were different. There are two good ways
to explore this question. First, we can go back in time, and see how prescriptions differed in
bygone eras, for example back before bounded rationality had supplanted perfect rationality as a
model of choice between alternatives. Second, we can look to other cultures, where people and
institutions may think about decision-making differently. Would the findings of El Sherif and El
Sawy (1988), based on research in Egypt’s government, translate well or poorly to similar
executive Cabinets in other countries?

Conclusion
Our central thesis has been that the way people think about decision-making, as a result
of the dialogue between research and practice, is important to understanding the interventions
that they make in the name of business intelligence. We have shown that three different kernel
theories from decision science explain three different sets of prescriptions, and three different
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categories of research questions, that are actually evident in the discipline. Moving forward, we
intend to design a research project to examine how these three practices complement and interact
with one another in a successful enterprise BI project.
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